UI reference

Verify integrity manifest

Verify a .dcm + .dcm.sig pair, or the folder of a batch run against its signed record.

Open this from Export, or from the empty screen with nothing loaded.

One file. Drop a DICOM file and its .dcm.sig integrity manifest. dcmage verifies the ECDSA P-256 (ES256) signature against the public key embedded in the manifest, then recomputes the SHA-256 hash of the bytes (and of the embedded audit snapshot) and compares them to the signed values. A green “Signature verified”, with the signer fingerprint, means the file is byte-for-byte identical to what was signed; a red “Verification FAILED” means a bad signature, a modified file, or a swapped/legacy/malformed manifest. Compare the fingerprint with the one the sender gave you: the key travels with the manifest, and a match does not show who holds it or that the file is correctly anonymized.

Batch run. Choose the folder a batch run wrote to. dcmage checks the signature on dcmage-run-manifest.jws.json, then the SHA-256 of every file it lists and of the report. A changed, missing or unreadable file fails the check and is named. A file the record does not cover, or a run recorded as incomplete, gives a result with notes, never a clean pass. Compare the thumbprint with the one the sender gave you: the key travels with the record, and a match does not show who holds it or that the files are correctly anonymized. This check is free and also runs in the browser.

Tip The sidecar also contains the full audit trail snapshot captured at the moment of export. Use it for chain-of-custody documentation. Caution This signs the detached .dcm.sig sidecar, not the DICOM file itself; in-file PS3.15 (CMS/PKCS#7) signatures for PACS interoperability are a separate, deferred feature.