Compliance

Corruption detection (hash audit)

Re-hash a file and compare it against a recorded digest to detect any post-export corruption or modification.

Problem

You’re exporting a de-identified DICOM file for a clinical trial and want to be able to detect whether the file was corrupted or modified after export. The app generates an integrity-manifest export: the DICOM file plus a detached .dcm.sig manifest holding a SHA-256 hash. Later, anyone can re-check the file’s integrity by recomputing the hash. Even a single byte changed after export will be detected.

Scope. This use case is the SHA-256 hash check that detects corruption and unintentional modification. The sidecar is also asymmetrically signed (ECDSA P-256 / ES256). The signature shows the file has not changed since a holder of the signing key signed it; it resists deliberate tampering only when you compare the signer fingerprint with one the sender gave you. See Cryptographically signed export for the signature and signing key workflow.

Steps

Export with Integrity Manifest

  1. Open the file (⌘O).

  2. Click Export in the top bar, then select Export with Integrity Manifest….

  3. Two files are saved. The browser downloads both; the desktop app opens a save panel for each, the second in the folder you chose for the first:

    • The DICOM file (.dcm)
    • The integrity manifest sidecar (.dcm.sig)

Verify Integrity

  1. Open the Verify integrity manifest window. ⌘K → type “verify” → select “Verify integrity manifest…”.

  2. Upload the DICOM file. Click the DICOM file upload area, select the .dcm file. A ✓ indicator confirms the file was loaded.

  3. Upload the manifest sidecar. Click the manifest upload area, select the .dcm.sig file. A ✓ indicator confirms it was loaded.

  4. Click Verify. If both files match, the modal shows a green “Signature verified” confirmation.

Detect Corruption

  1. Modify the DICOM file. Flip a single byte in the .dcm file on disk.

  2. Re-verify. Upload the modified .dcm and the original .sig sidecar. Click Verify.

  3. The modal shows “Verification FAILED”: the recomputed hash no longer matches the modified file.

Result

Exporting produces the .dcm and a detached, signed .dcm.sig manifest: a SHA-256 hash of the file plus a binding to the audit snapshot, signed with ECDSA P-256. Re-verifying the matching pair reads “Signature verified”, and a single changed byte is caught. It detects corruption. It detects deliberate tampering only when the signer fingerprint matches one the sender gave you, because anyone can sign a changed file again with a key of their own.