Chain-of-custody integrity-manifest export
Export a study with a SHA-256 integrity manifest and audit snapshot so recipients can detect corruption or modification.
Problem
For regulatory or legal purposes, you want to export a DICOM file alongside an integrity manifest that lets a recipient detect whether the file (or its audit snapshot) was corrupted or modified after export. The manifest is a SHA-256 hash stored in a detached sidecar (.dcm.sig) that can be independently re-checked.
Scope. The manifest carries a SHA-256 byte hash and a bound audit snapshot, and the sidecar is asymmetrically signed (ECDSA P-256 / ES256), so it is tamper-evident: it shows the file has not changed since a holder of the signing key signed it. It does not show who holds the key. See Cryptographically signed export for the signing identity and signature-verification workflow.
Steps
- Open the DICOM file. Click Files on the start screen (⌘O) and load the file to export.
- Export with integrity manifest. Click the Export button in the top bar, then select Export with Integrity Manifest….
- Save the outputs. The browser downloads two files, and the desktop app opens a save panel for each, the second in the folder you chose for the first:
filename_export.dcm(the exported DICOM file) andfilename_export.dcm.sig(the detached integrity manifest sidecar). - Verify integrity later. Open the Verify integrity manifest window (⌘K, then “Verify integrity manifest…”). Upload the
.dcmfile and its.dcm.sigsidecar. Click Verify. The modal shows “Signature verified” in green, with the signer fingerprint. - Test corruption detection. Modify even a single byte of the
.dcmfile. Re-verify: the modal shows “Verification FAILED” in red. - Verification scope. The manifest hashes the entire DICOM file and its audit snapshot. Any change to either, no matter how small, causes verification to fail.
Result
The chain-of-custody export writes the DICOM file plus a signed .dcm.sig sidecar. Upload both in the Verify modal and an unmodified file reads “Signature verified” with the signer fingerprint; change even one byte (or an audit snapshot) and it reads “Verification FAILED”. Compare the signer fingerprint with the one the sender gave you: the public key travels inside the sidecar, so anyone who changes the file can sign it again with a key of their own.