Compliance

Chain-of-custody integrity-manifest export

Export a study with a SHA-256 integrity manifest and audit snapshot so recipients can detect corruption or modification.

Problem

For regulatory or legal purposes, you want to export a DICOM file alongside an integrity manifest that lets a recipient detect whether the file (or its audit snapshot) was corrupted or modified after export. The manifest is a SHA-256 hash stored in a detached sidecar (.dcm.sig) that can be independently re-checked.

Scope. The manifest carries a SHA-256 byte hash and a bound audit snapshot, and the sidecar is asymmetrically signed (ECDSA P-256 / ES256), so it is tamper-evident: it shows the file has not changed since a holder of the signing key signed it. It does not show who holds the key. See Cryptographically signed export for the signing identity and signature-verification workflow.

Steps

  1. Open the DICOM file. Click Files on the start screen (⌘O) and load the file to export.
  2. Export with integrity manifest. Click the Export button in the top bar, then select Export with Integrity Manifest….
  3. Save the outputs. The browser downloads two files, and the desktop app opens a save panel for each, the second in the folder you chose for the first: filename_export.dcm (the exported DICOM file) and filename_export.dcm.sig (the detached integrity manifest sidecar).
  4. Verify integrity later. Open the Verify integrity manifest window (⌘K, then “Verify integrity manifest…”). Upload the .dcm file and its .dcm.sig sidecar. Click Verify. The modal shows “Signature verified” in green, with the signer fingerprint.
  5. Test corruption detection. Modify even a single byte of the .dcm file. Re-verify: the modal shows “Verification FAILED” in red.
  6. Verification scope. The manifest hashes the entire DICOM file and its audit snapshot. Any change to either, no matter how small, causes verification to fail.

Result

The chain-of-custody export writes the DICOM file plus a signed .dcm.sig sidecar. Upload both in the Verify modal and an unmodified file reads “Signature verified” with the signer fingerprint; change even one byte (or an audit snapshot) and it reads “Verification FAILED”. Compare the signer fingerprint with the one the sender gave you: the public key travels inside the sidecar, so anyone who changes the file can sign it again with a key of their own.